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A Right of Confrontation for 
Competition Hearings Before the 
European Commission 
Procedural fairness lies at the bedrock of justice.1 
Among all procedural rights in the American judicial system, 
the right of a criminal defendant to confront and cross-examine 
government witnesses is one of the most vital.2 Cross-
examination allows criminal defendants to test the perception 
and memory of witnesses, while giving a neutral fact-finder a 
first-hand view of the witnesses’ consistency, credibility, and 
biases.3 As Wigmore noted, it is “the greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth.”4 
On September 12, 2009, Christine Varney, the United 
States Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, called on 
“competition agencies, international organizations, and the 
antitrust community to discuss procedural fairness more 
broadly, focusing on the opportunity to refine procedures that 
parties can understand and rely on as a means of removing 
unnecessary uncertainty from enforcement efforts.”5 Nowhere 
is procedural fairness more important in competition law than 
in cartel enforcement, an area of the law dealing with 
agreements among competitors to restrain trade through 
actions such as “price-fixing, market allocation, and bid-
rigging,”6 where fines and prison sentences can have 
catastrophic consequences for defendants.7  
  
 1 See David E. Shipley, Due Process Rights before EU Agencies: The Rights of 
Defense, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 50-51 (2008); Christine A. Varney, Ass’t Attorney 
Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Procedural Fairness, Address Before the 
13th Annual Competition Conference of the International Bar Association 1 (Sept. 12, 
2009) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/249974.pdf). 
 2 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). 
 3 See Fred O. Smith, Crawford’s Aftershock: Aligning the Regulation of 
Nontestimonial Hearsay with the History and Purposes of the Confrontation Clause, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1497, 1518 (2008). 
 4 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (2d ed. 1923). 
 5 See Varney, supra note 1, at 4. 
 6 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
FIGHTING HARD CORE CARTELS: HARM, EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS AND LENIENCY 
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This note focuses on the adequacy of procedural 
safeguards in cartel enforcement proceedings in the European 
Union (“EU”). Specifically, it will investigate the European 
Commission’s8 (“EC” or “Commission”) use of “paperless” 
applications9 for leniency from fines and oral statements 
gathered during cartel investigations absent a right to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses. Because co-conspirators are 
rewarded with leniency based upon either the sufficiency or 
“added value” of the information they offer to the Commission,10 
they have an incentive to paint this evidence in a light least 
favorable to their fellow cartel members and most favorable to 
themselves.11 Without a mechanism for targeted corporations to 
directly ascertain the truth of those allegations,12 the use of oral 
statements as evidence in EC cartel enforcement proceedings 
raises a number of the classic evils against which the rights of 
confrontation and cross-examination are designed to protect.13 
Recently, commentators have argued that because oral 
statements in the EC are unsworn, declarants are not subject 
to compulsory process, and the prosecuted parties are not 
afforded an opportunity to confront and cross-examine 
declarants, the use of these statements as evidence violates the 
rights that targets of EC cartel enforcement proceedings should 
enjoy.14 However, the solutions that these critics have offered go 
too far—requiring a wholesale reform of EC competition 
  
PROGRAMS 11 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/44/1841891.pdf 
[hereinafter O.E.C.D., FIGHTING HARD CORE CARTELS]; Jason D. Medinger, Comment, 
Antitrust Leniency Programs: A Call for Increased Harmonization as Proliferating 
Programs Undermine Deterrence, 52 EMORY L.J. 1439, 1439 (2003). 
 7 Imran Aslam and Michael Ramsden, EC Dawn Raids: A Human Rights 
Violation?, 5 COMPETITION L. REV. 61, 62 (2008); Ian S. Forrester, Due Process in EC 
Competition Cases: A Distinguished Institution with Flawed Procedures, 34 EUR. L. 
REV. 817, 825-29 (2009); Donald Slater, Sébastien Thomas & Denis Waelbroeck, 
Competition Law Proceedings Before the European Commission and the Right to a Fair 
Trial: No Need for Reform?, 3-4, 10-11 (The Global Competition Law Centre Working 
Papers Series, Working Paper 04/08), available at http://www.coleurope.eu/content/ 
gclc/documents/GCLC%20WP%2004-08.pdf. 
 8 The European Commission is the administrative body of the European 
Union charged with enforcing its competition laws. Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, art. 105, Sept. 5. 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115/47). 
 9 Robert Grasso, Note, The E.U. Leniency Program and U.S. Civil Discovery 
Rules: A Fraternal Fight?, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 565, 577, 582 (2008); Julian M. Joshua, 
Oral Statements in EC Competition Proceedings: A Due Process Short-Cut?, 
COMPETITION L. INSIGHT, Dec. 7, 2004, at 1 (2004). 
 10 See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 11 Forrester, supra note 7, at 833. 
 12 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 13 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 14 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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procedure. This note proposes a more conservative solution 
grounded in the right of confrontation jurisprudence of the 
United States. 
Part I of this note will provide a brief historical 
overview of the global development of competition law, cartel 
enforcement, and leniency programs, and will present the 
United States’ approach as a model. Part II will outline the 
relevant competition laws of the EU, as well as the standards 
of procedural fairness that currently undergird those laws. 
Part III will argue that the current procedural safeguards have 
not kept pace with the EC’s substantive and procedural trends 
toward a criminal and adversarial system. Lastly, Part IV will 
survey competing proposals for procedural reforms in the EC 
and will offer a counterproposal. Specifically, this note will 
argue that the correct solution to the inadequacy of the current 
EC competition hearing procedures is to amend the regulations 
governing cartel enforcement to allow for a right to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses modeled on the American 
approach, as outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Crawford v. Washington.15 
I. BACKGROUND AND THE AMERICAN MODEL 
In order to understand the current European cartel 
enforcement regime, it is first important to understand the 
goals and development of competition laws. In general, 
competition laws are designed to promote competition in 
market economies for the benefit of consumers,16 a goal 
achieved through two basic means: (1) laws prohibiting 
excessive market power, and (2) laws designed to deter and 
prosecute unfair competition among competitors.17 The first 
category includes the regulation of mergers and acquisitions, as 
well as anti-monopoly laws, while the second category, which is 
the subject of this note, concerns the preservation of 
competition and market fairness.18 Additionally, a full 
understanding of modern European cartel enforcement 
requires a familiarity with the cartel enforcement regime of the 
  
 15 541 U.S. 36, 60-65, 68 (2004). 
 16 See Eleanor M. Fox, Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual 
Network, 43 INT’L LAW. 151, 152 (2009) [hereinafter Fox, Linked-In]. 
 17 Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, 
and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000) [hereinafter Fox, Antitrust and 
Regulatory Federalism]. 
 18 Id. 
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United States, which remains a dominant influence in the 
shaping of EC competition policies and procedures.19 
A. Background 
In response to the proliferation of industrial 
combinations, known as “trusts,” the United States enacted the 
Sherman Act of 1890, which was designed to (1) “prevent[] the 
high prices associated with monopoly or cartel activity” and to 
(2) protect[] the right of every person to practice a trade of 
choice.”20 For the next fifty years, aggressive competition 
enforcement was largely limited to the United States.21 
However, the second half of the twentieth century saw a 
significant increase in competition laws globally.22 Today, 
competition laws are enforced in over 100 jurisdictions,23 
including multiple cross-border competition “networks.”24 One 
area of competition law, cartel enforcement, is executed 
through a number of investigative and deterrent mechanisms 
designed to ferret out cartel activity, which is notoriously 
secretive.25 And while global competition authorities differ in 
their approaches to cartel enforcement, one mechanism has 
proved especially effective at cartel detection and enforcement: 
the “leniency program.”26 
Under a leniency program, a competition authority 
encourages cartel members to self-report anticompetitive 
  
 19 See Wouter P.J. Wils, Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the 
Answer?, 28 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 117, 136-37 (2005); A. Paul Victor, et 
al., International Cartels Roundtable, 2003 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. INT’L ANTITRUST 
LAW & POL. 93, 100 [hereinafter International Cartels Roundtable].  
 20 Lawrence A. Sullivan & Warren S. Grimes, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN 
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 6 (2000). 
 21 Fox, Linked-In, supra note 16, at 152. 
 22 See id. 
 23 Id. at 154. 
 24 Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism, supra note 17, at 1782. 
 25 See Gregory J. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the Punishment Fit 
the Crime 9, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/articles/240611.pdf (last 
visited June 26, 2010) (“[C]artel activity is almost invariably covert, and participants 
often engage in affirmative acts of concealments.”). 
 26 O.E.C.D., FIGHTING HARD CORE CARTELS supra note 6, at 7. (“Leniency 
programs uncover conspiracies that would otherwise go undetected and also make the 
ensuing investigations more efficient and effective. Experience shows that these 
programs work.”); Julian M. Joshua, That Uncertain Feeling: The Commission’s 2002 
Leniency Notice, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2006: ENFORCEMENT OF 
PROHIBITION OF CARTELS 512 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Anatnasiu eds., 
2006) (“[N]o self-respecting antitrust agency with any aspiration to effective 
enforcement is without a leniency policy.”). 
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conduct in return for a conditional promise either to refrain 
from bringing criminal charges or to reduce potential fines.27 
Leniency programs destabilize cartels by creating a “prisoner’s 
dilemma,” fostering distrust among co-conspirators and 
providing an incentive for each member to turn in its fellow 
cartel participants to competition authorities.28 The leniency 
program has been described by American officials as 
“[u]nquestionably . . . the greatest investigative tool ever 
designed to fight cartels.”29 The first cartel leniency program 
was developed in 1978 in the United States.30 Today, nearly 
fifty countries have enacted leniency programs.31 These 
programs have been highly successful, resulting in 
extraordinary fines and significant prison sentences.32  
B. The American Model 
The United States takes an aggressive approach to 
criminal cartel enforcement. The Assistant Attorney General 
for the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has 
stated that cartel conduct is “unambiguously harmful.”33 The 
United States Supreme Court has described cartels as “the 
supreme evil of antitrust.”34 Government officials have justified 
criminal prosecution of cartel offenses on a number of grounds, 
including the secretive nature of cartels,35 the existence of 
  
 27 See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel 
Stability, 31 J. CORP. L. 453, 454, 473-77 (2006). 
 28 See Roger W. Fones, Rony P. Gerrits & Nicole D. Devero, Antitrust 
Leniency Programs and their Impact on the Aviation Industry, AIR & SPACE L., at 1, 19 
(2008) (internal quotations omitted); Leslie, supra note 27 at 455. 
 29 Scott D. Hammond, Dir. Of Crim. Enforcement, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program, Presented Before the ICN 
Workshop on Leniency Programs 2 (November 22-23, 2004) (transcript available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/206611.pdf) [hereinafter Hammond, Cornerstones of 
an Effective Leniency Program]. 
 30 J. Anthony Chavez, More Aggressive Action to Curb International Cartels, 
1739 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE: CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK 
SERIES 807, 818 (2009); Hammond, Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program, 
supra note 29, at 3 & n.1. 
 31 See Chavez, supra note 30, at 853. 
 32 See, e.g., id. at 847-48. 
 33 Christine A. Varney, Ass’t Att. General, Antitrust Div. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Striving for the Optimal Balance in Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks Prepared 
for The Council on Foreign Relations 14 (Oct. 8, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/250814.pdf). 
 34 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 408 (2004). 
 35 International Cartels Roundtable, supra note 19, at 96. James Griffin, who 
was then the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the U.S. 
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criminal intent when participating in a cartel, and the 
inherently anticompetitive conduct of cartels.36 The American 
impulse to view cartel conduct as criminal has “been part of the 
American antitrust system from the beginning,”37 and it is an 
impulse that is reflected in its laws, severe penalties, and 
aggressive enforcement techniques.38 However, the United 
States also maintains a robust set of procedural protections, 
which guard against prosecutorial abuse and ensure respect for 
the fundamental rights of defendants at trial.39 
1. The Antitrust Laws 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal.”40 Despite the breadth of Section 1 prohibitions, U.S. 
criminal cartel enforcement primarily focuses on price-fixing,41 
bid-rigging,42 and market allocation43 between competitors—
known as the “hard-core” antitrust offenses.44 The penalties for 
  
Department of Justice, noted that international cartels, “like all other cartels, are 
secret in nature. Often victims don’t even know they are being victimized, and 
increasingly cartel members are taking actions to ensure that they do not leave 
significant evidence around. . . .” Id. 
 36 See Werden, supra note 25, at 5. 
 37 Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish 
Cartels and Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 694 (2001). 
 38 See Wils, supra note 19, at 122-24. 
 39 Id. 
 40 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 41 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRICE FIXING, BID RIGGING, AND MARKET 
ALLOCATION SCHEMES: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT TO LOOK FOR 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/211578.pdf (“Price fixing is an agreement 
among competitors to raise, fix, or otherwise maintain the price at which their goods or 
services are sold. It is not necessary that the competitors agree to charge exactly the 
same price, or that every competitor in a given industry join the conspiracy.”) 
[hereinafter PRICE FIXING, BID RIGGING, AND MARKET ALLOCATION SCHEMES]. 
 42 See id. (“Bid rigging is the way that conspiring competetors [sic] effectively 
raise prices where purchasers — often federal, state, or local governments — acquire 
goods or services by soliciting competing bids.”). 
 43 See id. at 3 (“Market division or allocation schemes are agreements in 
which competitors divide markets among themselves. In such schemes, competing 
firms allocate specific customers or types of customers, products, or territories among 
themselves.”). 
 44 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
HANDBOOK 3 (2d ed. 2006); Baker, supra note 37, at 694-95 (“Over time . . . the DOJ, 
and more importantly the courts, gradually developed distinguishing lines between the 
kinds of anticompetitive conduct that should be punished criminally and the remaining 
conduct, which would only be subject to civil injunctions by the government and private 
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criminal antitrust violations in the United States are 
potentially severe. Under the Antitrust Criminal Penalty 
Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 (“ACPERA”), guilty 
corporations face fines as high as $100 million, while 
individuals may face up to $1 million in fines and ten years in 
jail.45 These aggressive and ever-increasing penalties have led 
to the collection of over $5.3 billion in fines over the last fifteen 
years.46 
2. Powers of Investigation and the Division’s Leniency 
Program 
The United States Department of Justice’s Antitrust 
Division (the “Division”) enforces the Sherman Act by 
conducting investigations and prosecuting offending 
corporations and individuals in federal court.47 Division 
investigations employ a wide array of aggressive techniques, 
including wiretaps, informants, and search warrants, to 
discover cartels and to build cases.48 However, above all other 
techniques, the Corporate and Individual Leniency Programs 
have been the “most effective generator of international cartel 
cases” for the Division.49  
The Division first adopted its Corporate Leniency 
Program in 1978, and subsequently revised it in 1993.50 The 
  
damage cases by injured victims. Thus, price-fixing, bid-rigging, and customer and 
market allocations came to be regarded as criminal, while most other conduct (for 
example, joint venture rules, standard setting practices, and vertical restraints) came 
to be regarded as only suitable for civil prosecution.”) (citations omitted); Michael 
Lazerwitz & Adam Miller, USA, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO 
CARTELS & LENIENCY 2009 261, available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/ 
Publications/pdf/2577.pdf (internal quotations omitted). 
 45 See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-237, §215, 118 Stat. 661, 668 (2004); Chavez, supra note 30, at 855-61; 
Michael D. Hausfeld, Michael P. Lehmann & Megan E. Jones, Observations from the 
Field: ACPERA’s First Five Years, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 95, 96-97 (2009). 
 46 See Chavez, supra note 30, at 836. 
 47 PRICE FIXING, BID RIGGING, AND MARKET ALLOCATION SCHEMES, supra 
note 41, at 1. 
 48 Chavez, supra note 30, at 824-26. 
 49 Scott D. Hammond, Dir. Of Crim. Enforcement, Antirust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, A Summary Overview of the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement 
Program, Presented Before the New York State Bar Association Annual Meeting 5 
(Jan. 23, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/ 
200686.pdf) [hereinafter Hammond, Summary Overview]. 
 50 Hammond, Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program, supra note 29, 
at 3 n.1. Describing the changes from 1978 to 1993, Hammond noted that “[t]he 
Amnesty Program was revised in three major respects. First, the policy was changed to 
ensure that amnesty is automatic if there is no pre-existing investigation. . . . Second, 
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revised program sets forth two means of achieving leniency, 
“Part A Leniency”51 and “Part B Leniency,”52 which are 
differentiated based on whether the Division is aware of the 
illegal activity being reported at the time when the corporation 
  
the Division created an alternative amnesty, whereby amnesty is available even if 
cooperation begins after an investigation is underway. Third, if a corporation qualifies 
for automatic amnesty, then all directors, officers, and employees who come forward 
with the corporation and agree to cooperate also receive automatic amnesty.” Id. 
 51 Under Part A Leniency, the Division will grant a corporation leniency if, 
before an investigation has begun, it meets six criteria:  
1. At the time the corporation comes forward to report the illegal activity, the 
Division has not received information about the illegal activity being reported 
from any other source;  
2. The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal activity being reported, 
took prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity; 
3. The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and 
provides full, continuing and complete cooperation to the Division throughout 
the investigation; 
4. The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as opposed to 
isolated confessions of individual executives or officials; 
5. Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured parties; and  
6. The corporation did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal 
activity and clearly was not the leader in, or originator of, the activity.  
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY 1-2 (1993), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf [hereinafter CORPORATE 
LENIENCY POLICY]. 
 52 Under Part B Leniency, if a corporation does not meet the requirements for 
Part A Leniency, it may qualify for leniency if—before or after an investigation has 
begun—it meets the following seven criteria: 
1. The corporation is the first one to come forward and qualify for leniency 
with respect to the illegal activity being reported;  
2. The Division, at the time the corporation comes in, does not yet have 
evidence against the company that is likely to result in a sustainable 
conviction;  
3. The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal activity being reported, 
took prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity; 
4. The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and 
provides full, continuing and complete cooperation that advances the Division 
in its investigation; 
5. The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as opposed to 
isolated confessions of individual executives or officials; 
6. Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured parties; and 
7. The Division determines that granting leniency would not be unfair to 
others, considering the nature of the illegal activity, the confessing 
corporation’s role in it, and when the corporation comes forward. 
Id. at 2-3. 
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first applies for leniency. In 1994, the Division also released an 
Individual Leniency Policy, which encourages “individuals who 
approach the Division on their own behalf, not as part of a 
corporate proffer or confession, to seek leniency for reporting 
illegal antitrust activity of which the Division has not 
previously been made aware.”53 Additionally, only the first 
corporation or individual to approach the Division is granted 
leniency, creating a race between conspirators.54  
Leniency applications to the Division may be made in 
writing or orally,55 although full cooperation inevitably requires 
witness statements and the production of relevant documents.56 
The availability of oral—or “paperless”—leniency is vital to the 
success of the program, because “amnesty does not protect 
recipients from liability in private damage actions, [such that] 
companies would be loathe to participate or cooperate if there 
were a substantial risk that the evidence they provide the 
Justice Department could be used against them in the civil 
suits that inevitably follow.”57  
In the event that a corporation or individual is granted 
leniency, the Department of Justice issues a Conditional 
Leniency Letter, which contains the conditions of leniency and 
the cooperation required of that corporation or individual.58 
  
 53 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., LENIENCY POLICY FOR 
INDIVIDUALS 1 (1994), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 
0092.pdf. In order to qualify for individual leniency, the applicant in question (1) must 
approach the Division before it has received any information about the anticompetitive 
conduct and prior to the initiation of any investigation or corporate application for 
leniency; (2) must report the illegal activity “with candor and completeness” and 
“provide[] full, continuing and complete cooperation to the Division throughout the 
investigation;” and (3) the individual must not have “coerce[d] another party to 
participate in the illegal activity” and must not have been the “leader in, or originator 
of, the activity.” Id. at 1-2. 
 54 See CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 51. 
 
55
 William Kolasky, Criminalising Cartel Activity: Lessons from the U.S. 
Experience, 12 COMPETITION & CONSUMER L. REV. 207, 213 (2004). 
 56 See Lazerwitz & Miller, supra note 44, at 264. 
 57 Kolasky, supra note 55, at 213. 
 58 This cooperation includes seven elements, requiring the corporation to: (a) 
provide “a full exposition” of all the facts relevant to its anticompetitive conduct; (b) 
produce the remaining, non-privileged, relevant documents related to that conduct; (c) 
to secure and encourage current and former “directors, officers, and employees” to 
provide all relevant information related to the conduct; (d) to facilitate the appearance 
of such employees for interviews and testimony related to the reported anticompetitive 
activity; (e) to use its “best efforts” to ensure “complete[], candid[], and truthful[]” 
responses to all interviews, grand jury appearances, and trials; (f) to use its “best 
efforts” to ensure that such individuals “make no attempt either falsely to protect or 
falsely to implicate any person or entity;” and (g) to make all reasonable efforts to pay 
restitution to those injured by any anticompetitive conduct reported that effects the 
United States. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division, Model Corporate Conditional 
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Furthermore, the Corporate Conditional Leniency Letter 
extends leniency to those directors, officers, and employees who 
provide relevant information and admit to anticompetitive 
activity, subject to further conditions.59 If the applying 
corporation or individual meets the conditions for leniency and 
the Division receives the benefit of the information that the 
leniency applicant provides, the Division will grant Final 
Leniency.60 
Where the Division determines that there is sufficient 
evidence to proceed with a prosecution—generally where there 
is direct evidence of collusion—it may convene a grand jury61 to 
determine whether there is enough evidence to bring formal 
charges against the alleged conspirators.62 Once formal charges 
are brought, federal cartel cases are tried in open court before a 
judge and jury, with attendant procedural rights for defendants 
and a requirement that the alleged conduct be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.63 
3. Procedural Fairness in the United States 
While the United States has historically approached 
cartel enforcement with vigor—whether through persistent 
investigation, innovative programs, or devastating penalties—
its zealousness has been tempered by a robust set of procedural 
safeguards, including (1) constitutional safeguards, (2) 
statutory safeguards, and (3) policy safeguards.64 One vital 
constitutional provision is the criminal defendant’s right to 
  
Leniency Letter 2-3 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/ 
239524.pdf [hereinafter Model Corporate Conditional Leniency Letter]; see also U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division, Model Individual Conditional Leniency Letter 
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/239526.pdf. 
 59 See CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY, supra note 51, at 4 (“If a corporation 
qualifies for leniency under Part A, above, all directors, officers, and employees of the 
corporation who admit their involvement in the illegal antitrust activity as part of the 
corporate confession will receive leniency, in the form of not being charged criminally 
for the illegal activity, if they admit their wrongdoing with candor and completeness 
and continue to assist the Division throughout the investigation.”). 
 60 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S LENIENCY PROGRAM AND MODEL 
LENIENCY LETTERS 24-27 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
criminal/239583.pdf; Model Corporate Conditional Leniency Letter, supra note 58, at 1. 
 61 DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV. GRAND JURY MANUAL, I-2-I-7 (1991), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/206542.pdf. 
 62 Id. 
 63 These procedures are required under the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Wils, supra note 19, at 124. 
 64 Wils, supra note 19, at 124. 
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confront and cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses at 
trial.65 This right is buttressed by criminal and procedural 
sanctions for untruthful witness practices.66 One recent and 
notable case, United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., demonstrates 
the necessity of these procedural safeguards.67 
a. Constitutional Safeguards—The Right of 
Confrontation 
The Constitution of the United States enshrines a 
panoply of rights for criminal defendants at trial.68 These rights 
form the procedural backbone of the adversarial system, one 
which presumes the innocence of defendants and includes both 
a jury and “a judge who does not . . . conduct the factual and 
legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of 
facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties.”69 One 
of the key facets of the adversarial system in the United States 
is the right of a defendant to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses against him or her. The Supreme Court has held this 
right to exist in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution.70  
First, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him . . . .”71 Centuries of Supreme Court case law have 
interpreted this clause as requiring “an opportunity for cross-
examination by defense counsel in front of the jury, ordinarily 
with the defendant and the witness both in the courtroom.”72 
The Confrontation Clause serves a number of purposes, 
reflecting a cold view of the inquisitorial practices of 
  
 65 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 66 These protections are both statutory and contractual. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 401-02, 1503, 1621, 1623 (2006); see also Model Corporate Conditional Leniency 
Letter (2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/239524.pdf. 
 67 United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 524 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D. Pa. 2007); 
see discussion infra Part I.B.3.c. 
 68 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI. These rights include the right against self-
incrimination, the right to a speedy and public trial, the right to an impartial jury, and 
the right of the accused to confront adverse witnesses. Id. 
 69 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991). 
 70 U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI, XIV; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 71 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 72 David A. Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1635, 1645 
(2009). 
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Continental Europe (and their brief use in England), and 
effectuating important practical objectives.73 First, the 
Confrontation Clause, together with its attendant right to 
cross-examination, serves as a shield against inquisitorial 
practices that were commonplace in medieval and renaissance 
England.74 These practices were first introduced through the 
English Marian bail and committal statutes, under which 
justices of the peace, acting both as investigators and 
prosecutors, were required to interrogate suspects and 
witnesses ex parte in order to determine whether to discharge 
or commit the suspects until trial.75 The results of these 
examinations were certified in court, and while they were not 
originally intended to serve as evidence against the defendant 
at trial, over time that practice began to invade the adversarial 
system.76  
The danger of these practices came into clear view 
during the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603.77 There, the 
defendant Raleigh was tried for treason based on the ex parte, 
signed confession of his alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham, who 
had been imprisoned.78 Because Cobham later retracted his 
  
 73 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
 74 Id. at 44-45; Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the 
Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 
557, 569-70 (1992) (“With the ascent of the Tudors, the English crown began to exercise 
more control over its enemies by importing techniques from the civil law in to the 
indigenous, essentially accusatorial, system of criminal procedure. Criminal 
proceedings took on a more inquisitorial slant with the use of preliminary 
examinations and increased reliance on prerogative courts . . . During the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, justices of the peace conducted preliminary examinations in 
ordinary criminal proceedings at common law. The justices—government officials who 
exercised police, administrative and judicial functions—privately interrogated the 
suspect, his accusers, and the witnesses against him. These examinations were then 
introduced into evidence to the detriment of the defendant who had neither the 
assistance of counsel nor the ability to call witnesses on his behalf . . . . In cases of 
great political importance, however, the Privy Council, or the judicial members of the 
Council, examined the suspect and the other witnesses. At trial, proof usually consisted 
of reading statements that had been made out of court, such as depositions, confessions 
of accomplices, and letters. In his history of the common law, Stephen concluded that 
this prosecution on the basis of written statements ‘occasioned frequent demands by 
the prisoner to have his “accusers,” i.e. the witnesses against him, brought before him 
face to face.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 75 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-45. 
 76 Id. However, some commentators have challenged the Court’s historical 
accuracy on this point. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and 
When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. 
L. REV. 105, 107-08 (2005); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical 
Assumptions of Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 224 (2005). 
 77 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
 78 See generally 1 CRIMINAL TRIALS 389-520 (David Jardine ed., 1850). 
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confession, Raleigh argued that the confession should not be 
used against him, and demanded to have Cobham brought 
before the court, believing that Cobham would not corroborate 
his previous confession in open court with Raleigh present.79 
The Court refused this request and sentenced Raleigh to 
death.80 The public viewed this refusal as an egregious 
perversion of common law procedure, and it ultimately spurred 
the institution of the protective procedural rights of 
confrontation and cross-examination both in England and the 
early United States.81 
However, while some commentators have asserted that 
the purpose of the Confrontation Clause in American 
jurisprudence ends with “anti-inquisitorialism,”82 in fact, the 
clause finds solid grounding in practical objectives well-served 
by the rights.83 These purposes include the ability to test the 
perception and memory of a witness; the ability of the trier of 
fact to view a witness’ “demeanor and language” when 
subjected to questioning; the ability to focus a witness’ 
testimony on key issues or discrepancies; the ability to 
immediately challenge a witness’ story; and the ability to 
reveal potential biases in a witness’ account.84 At its core, the 
Confrontation Clause is “designed to promote the truth.”85 
  
 79 At the trial, Raleigh stated, “It is now clear that he hath since retracted; 
therefore since his accusation is recalled by himself, let him now by word of mouth 
convict or condemn me.” Id. at 434. 
 80 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
 81 Id. at 44, 47-48; see also Jules Epstein, Cross-Examination: Seemingly 
Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipotent, and “At Risk”, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 427, 429-30 
(2009) (“Langbein found cross-examination to be a necessary . . . response to three 
occurrences in the English trial system: the growing use of lawyers to present 
prosecutions in both the investigative and trial stages; the reward system that offered 
bounties to those who provided testimony establishing that a crime reached the 
severity (or degree of financial loss) to qualify as a felony and thus invited fraudulent 
testimony, the corrupt motive of which required cross-examination as an antidote; and 
‘the crown witness system for obtaining accomplice evidence in gang crimes, a 
prosecutorial technique that created further risks of perjured testimony.’”) (citing JOHN 
H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 246 (2003)). 
 82 Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 694 
(1996) (describing the history behind the Confrontation Clause as one “born of 
revulsion against trial by affidavit.”); see also Sklansky, supra note 72, at 1688-94. 
 83 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 n.4 (1974); Amar, supra note 82, at 
688; Berger, supra note 74, at 560-61; Fred O. Smith, Crawford’s Aftershock: Aligning 
the Regulation of Nontestimonial Hearsay with the History and Purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1497, 1518 (2008). 
 84 Davis, 415 U.S. at 316; Smith, supra note 83, at 1518. 
 85 Amar, supra note 82, at 649, 688. 
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Recently, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of 
the Confrontation Clause in a series of groundbreaking cases,86 
beginning with Crawford v. Washington.87 In Crawford, the 
Court relied on American and English common law to reach an 
understanding of the Confrontation Clause intended to reflect 
its original meaning.88 Specifically, the Court held that 
“testimonial” hearsay statements,89 when made by a witness 
who is not present at trial, are inadmissible as evidence unless 
(1) the witness is unavailable and (2) the defendant previously 
had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.90 The Court 
broadly defined a “witness” as any person who “bears 
testimony,” and further defined testimony as “typically ‘[a] 
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact.’”91 As a result, the Crawford 
standard rejected the test set forth in an earlier case, Ohio v. 
Roberts, which admitted hearsay statements of witnesses not 
available for cross-examination so long as those statements 
bore sufficient “indicia of reliability.”92 In overruling Roberts, 
  
 86 Melendez-Diaz v. Mass., 129 S. Ct. 2927 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-45. 
 87 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-45. 
 88 Id. at 43-50. Although some critics have called into question the accuracy 
and rigor of the majority’s historical analysis, see, e.g., Davies, supra note 76, at 114-20, 
the purpose of recounting the history and holding of Crawford here is solely to 
highlight the dangers of inquisitorialism that the opinion addresses, and the ways in 
which it attempts to formulate a confrontation framework that protects against those 
dangers. 
 89 “Hearsay” is defined in U.S. federal law as “a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted.” FED R. EVID. 801(c). 
 90 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 91 Id.; see also Sklansky, supra note 72, at 1646 (“Introducing evidence of an 
out-of-court accusation from someone who never testifies raises some of the same 
concerns as examining a witness outside the defendant’s presence: in either case the 
defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine the accuser in front of the jury.”). 
 92 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (“[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not 
present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a 
showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears 
adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where 
the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence 
must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”). Notably, and most egregiously, in the years leading up to the 
Roberts decision, a number of appellate circuits extended the so-called “residual” 
hearsay exception, FED. R. EVID. 807, to admit grand jury testimony of witnesses who 
did not testify at trial. Berger, supra note 74, at 610 (in describing the dangers of this 
practice in the context of prosecutorial overreach, Professor Berger stated the 
following: “[A]dmitting grand jury testimony by a now-unavailable declarant pursuant 
to the residual hearsay exception . . . is clearly incompatible with a prosecutorial 
restraint interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. These statements are elicited, and 
often prepared, by the prosecutor. It is difficult to imagine why the statement of 
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the Crawford Court argued that “[r]eliability is an amorphous, 
if not entirely subjective, concept,”93 such that the Roberts test 
is “permanently” unpredictable and does not adequately 
conform to the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.94 Thus, 
despite the criticism of the Crawford majority’s originalist 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, commentators have 
praised the majority’s “more principled” approach.95 
The applicability and necessity of cross-examination 
have also been recognized in the context of civil and 
administrative hearings, grounded in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clauses.96 In Goldberg v. Kelly, the 
Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment required “the opportunity to be heard;” 
that is, a hearing “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.”97 Additionally, the Court noted that “[i]n almost every 
setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, 
due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses.”98 Later, in Mathews v. Eldridge, 
the Court further clarified the Goldberg standard in the 
context of the Fifth Amendment, creating a test under which 
courts balance three factors to determine whether procedural 
safeguards in a given case are sufficient; namely, (1) “the 
  
Cobham put before a grand jury would differ significantly in the content from the 
accusation he made against Sir Walter Raleigh. The prosecutor has an incentive to 
lean on the prospective witness to shape the grand jury testimony in accordance with 
the prosecution’s theory of the case in order to secure an indictment and to freeze the 
witness’s story as much as possible.”). 
 93 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63. 
 94 Id. at 68 n.10. 
 95 Robert M. Pitler, Symposium, Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future 
of the Confrontation Clause in Light of its Past: Introduction, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 33-
34 (2005) (“[M]uch to its credit, the Crawford majority focuses on statements secured 
by law enforcement interrogation of individuals who respond with testimony-bearing 
statements. The introduction of such statements at trial and the defendant’s inability 
to cross-examine the absent declarant are a core concern of the Confrontation Clause. 
Thus, centering analysis on practices that are modern-day counterparts to the abuses 
targeted by the Clause is particularly appropriate . . . . [T]he categorical exclusion of 
testimonial statements absent cross-examination of the declarant surely should prove a 
more principled, and less subjective approach than, and without the ‘unpardonable 
vice’ of, the Roberts indicia of reliability framework.”); Roger C. Park, Purpose as a 
Guide to the Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 297, 297 
(2005) (“I applaud the change from Ohio v. Roberts to Crawford v. Washington[.]”). 
 96 U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV § 1. 
 97 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68 (1970) (explaining that in the context of 
termination of benefits, an administrative procedure, such as a hearing, requires 
“timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an 
effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting 
his own arguments and evidence orally.”) (emphasis added). 
 98 Id. at 269. 
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private interest that will be affected by official action;” (2) “the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional 
substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.”99 As such, whether or not 
a strict, incarceratory liberty interest is involved, the American 
system constitutionally recognizes the need for confrontation 
and cross-examination in judicial proceedings. 
b. Statutory and Policy-based Protections 
Defendants’ rights are also protected through statutory 
and contractual provisions designed to ensure witness truth-
telling.100 First, the Federal Rules of Evidence (“Federal Rules”) 
provide a number of protections for defendants in criminal and 
civil cases, including (1) a requirement that all witnesses must 
swear or affirm to “testify truthfully,”101 and (2) rules bearing on 
hearsay testimony, which bar out-of-court statements offered 
for the truth of those statements absent one of the enumerated 
exceptions to or exemptions from the Federal Rules.102 
Furthermore, non-evidentiary statutory law prohibits perjury, 
the making of false statements or declarations, actions in 
contempt of court, and obstruction of justice.103 Lastly, in the 
cartel enforcement context, the Division’s leniency agreements 
include contractual requirements of witness appearance and 
truthfulness as conditions of leniency.104 The practical effect of 
these statutory rules and contractual provisions in the context 
  
 99 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 100 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 401-02, 1503 1621, 1623 (2006). 
 101 FED. R. OF EVID. 603 (“Before testifying, every witness shall be required to 
declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a 
form calculated to awaken the witness’ conscience and impress the witness’ mind with 
the duty to do so.”). 
 102 FED. R. EVID. 801-07. 
 103 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 401-402, 1503 1621, 1623. 
 104 For example, the Division’s Model Conditional Leniency Agreements note 
that witnesses:  
when called upon to do so by the United States, [testify] in trial and grand 
jury or other proceedings in the United States, fully, truthfully, and under 
oath, subject to the penalties of perjury (18 U.S.C. § 1621), making false 
statements or declarations in grand jury or court proceedings (18 U.S.C. 
§ 1623), contempt (18 U.S.C. §§ 401-402), and obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. 
§ 1503-1521), in connection with the anticompetitive activity being reported. 
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of the Division’s leniency program is to strongly discourage 
leniency applicants from providing false or misleading 
testimony, to penalize those corporations and individuals who 
seek to obtain leniency or punish co-conspirators through 
dishonesty, and to ensure compliance with the above-
mentioned constitutional provisions, including the 
Confrontation Clause.105 In fact, the Division has used allegedly 
untruthful statements as a basis for revoking conditional 
leniency, as in the case of United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A.106 
However, the true lesson of Stolt-Nielsen lies in its revelation of 
both the pervasiveness of witness dishonesty and the necessity 
of a right of confrontation in cartel proceedings. 
c. The Case of United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. 
The necessity for the right of a defendant to confront 
adverse witnesses has been demonstrated clearly and recently 
in the cartel enforcement context. In 2003, the Antitrust 
Division revoked conditional leniency from Stolt-Nielsen S.A., a 
Norwegian company involved in a cartel within the bulk 
chemical shipping industry.107 The Division’s revocation was 
grounded in the allegations of co-conspirators who had been 
successfully prosecuted on the basis of evidence contained 
within Stolt-Nielsen’s leniency application to U.S. antitrust 
authorities.108 These co-conspirators alleged that Stolt-Nielsen 
had failed to take “prompt and effective action” to terminate its 
involvement in the conspiracy after it first discovered the anti-
competitive activity.109 Following a series of civil proceedings 
challenging the revocation of leniency,110 the Division indicted 
Stolt-Nielsen for its self-reported Sherman Act violations.111 
However, the district court dismissed the indictment, finding 
after an evidentiary hearing that the Division’s allegations that 
Stolt-Nielsen breached the leniency agreement were meritless, 
  
 105 Hammond, Summary Overview, supra note 49, at 5. 
 106 United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 524 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 107 Id. at 614. 
 108 Id. at 614, 623. 
 109 Id. at 616. 
 110 Stolt-Nielsen had successfully sought to enjoin the Division from revoking 
leniency. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 553, 555 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
However, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
United States, 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006), after which the Division filed its 
indictment. 
 111 Stolt-Nielsen, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 615. 
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and therefore that the Division’s revocation of leniency and 
subsequent prosecution was improper.112 Importantly, the court 
found that the testimony of the Division’s witnesses—the 
cooperating co-conspirators—lacked credibility.113  
First, the court noted that each of the witnesses had a 
strong motive to lie to the Division in exchange for leniency in 
their own criminal sentences.114 Second, when confronted on 
cross-examination, the witnesses’ were not credible and were 
repeatedly impeached.115 The Division witnesses’ testimonies 
were self-contradictory and riddled with material 
misstatements of fact, which appeared both in the live 
testimony and in sworn grand jury statements.116 Absent the 
right to cross-examine these government witnesses, it is 
unlikely that Stolt-Nielsen would have been able to prevail in 
its motion, and could have faced extraordinary fines and prison 
terms based almost entirely on the false testimony of its co-
conspirators.117 The case of Stolt-Nielsen highlights the acute 
danger of using the out-of-court statements of co-conspirators—
even when sworn—to establish cartel violations, as well as the 
unassailable value of cross-examination in the antitrust 
context. 
  
 112 Id. at 628. 
 113 Id. at 623. 
 114 Id. (“Each witness . . . had a strong motive to seek leniency from the 
Division and to retaliate against a competitor that had implicated him in a criminal 
conspiracy.”). 
 115 Id. at 623-27. When discussing the credibility of co-conspirator Hugo 
Finlay, the court noted that he “was impeached repeatedly with prior inconsistent 
sworn testimony,” first denying knowledge of the conspiracy “despite the fact that he 
had actively participated in it.” Id. at 624. In addition, when confronted about 
allegations he had made with regard to an anticompetitive quid pro quo agreement, 
Finlay “conceded on cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge of such a 
quid pro quo.” Id. With respect to another co-conspirator witness, Jarle Haugsdal, the 
court noted that Haugsdal had “provided repeated false accounts” about his company’s 
role in the conspiracy in his plea agreement, and that his “sworn grand jury 
declaration . . . was replete with material misstatements of fact.” Id. at 624-25. 
Furthermore, “[w]hen confronted with the inconsistencies, Haugsdal was uncertain 
how or by whom his declaration was prepared.” Id. at 625. Moreover, while cooperating 
witness Erik Nielsen testified “[o]n direct examination . . . that Stolt-Nielsen continued 
to participate in the conspiracy after [it discovered the anticompetitive conduct], when 
confronted with examples of vigorous post-March 2002 competition, Nielsen conceded 
that it was not ‘business as usual,’ [i.e. anticompetitive,] and repeatedly disavowed 
familiarity with the business,” stating that he “‘was not involved at all,’” and “‘not 
familiar at all with these matters.’” Id. at 626. Finally, and most incredibly, one 
cooperating witness, Bjorn Sjaastad, stated that “he was not aware that his conduct 
was illegal until he read [a newspaper] article reporting on antitrust violations in the 
parcel-tanker industry.” Id. 
 116 See id. at 623-27. 
 117 Id. at 623. 
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II. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION APPROACH TO CARTEL 
ENFORCEMENT 
Similarly to the United States, the EU has had a 
significant history of cartel enforcement, animated from the 
start by the need to protect the European common market.118 
Cartel enforcement falls within the purview of the EC, an 
“integrated” administrative agency within the EU that 
performs its own investigations, regulatory enforcement, and 
adjudications.119 Investigations typically begin either with a 
customer complaint sent to the EC,120 ex officio,121 or through an 
application for leniency.122 The investigatory stage of cartel 
enforcement in the EC is conducted by the Directorate General 
for Competition (“DG Competition”).123 These investigations use 
aggressive techniques inspired by American criminal cartel 
enforcement, and increasingly rely on oral evidence gathered in 
leniency applications and raids on targeted individuals and 
businesses.124 Upon a determination that there is sufficient 
evidence to prosecute undertaking party, the DG Competition 
case team prepares a “Statement of Objections,” which outlines 
the factual bases for the violation alleged.125  
The filing of a Statement of Objections triggers a series 
of procedural “rights of defense” for the alleged infringers, 
including the “right of access” to the DG Competition case file 
  
 118 Directorate General for Competition, European Commission, http://ec. 
europa.eu/dgs/competition/mission/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2010) (“The mission of the 
Directorate General for Competition (DG Competition) is to enable the Commission to 
make markets deliver more benefits to consumers, businesses and the society as a 
whole, by protecting competition on the market and fostering a competition culture. We 
do this through the enforcement of competition rules and through actions aimed at 
ensuring that regulation takes competition duly into account among other public policy 
interests.”). 
 119 Michael Trebilcock & Edward Iacobucci, Designing Competition Law 
Institutions, 25 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 361, 380-83 (2002). 
 120 DG COMPETITION, BEST PRACTICES ON THE CONDUCT OF PROCEEDINGS 
CONCERNING ARTICLES 101 and 102 TFEU 6 (2010), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
consultations/2010_best_practices/best_practice_articles.pdf [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES]. 
 121 Id. at 6-7 (“The Commission may also open a case on its own initiative (ex 
officio), for instance when certain facts have been brought to its attention, or further to 
information gathered in the context of sector enquiries, informal meetings with 
industry or the monitoring of markets, or on the basis of information exchanged within 
the European Competition Network . . . .”). 
 122 Id. at 7. 
 123 BEST PRACTICES, supra note 120, at 6-17; Aslam & Ramsden, supra note 7, 
at 61; VAN BAEL & BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY § 10.10 
(2004). 
 124 Forrester, supra note 7, at 833. 
 125 BEST PRACTICES, supra note 120, at 18. 
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and the “right to be heard” by the Commission.126 The primary 
catalysts for these procedural developments have come from 
common law Member States, the United States, and the 
European appellate courts, specifically the Court of First 
Instance (“CFI”)127 and the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”).128 
Ultimately, these procedural rights were formalized in EC 
Regulations 1/2003 and 773/2004, which represent a 
convergence of the procedural safeguards in the EU and those 
of adversarial criminal justice systems in the United States 
and elsewhere.129 However, despite the fact that the EC has 
continually improved the defensive rights of accused entities, it 
has neglected to impose one fundamental and necessary right: 
the right of confrontation.130 
A. Competition Law and Procedure in the EU 
The EU prohibits anticompetitive conduct in Article 101 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”).131 Specifically, Article 101(1) prohibits “all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the internal market.”132 An “undertaking,” for the 
purposes of Article 101, covers a broad array of entities, 
  
 126 Michael Asimow & Lisl Dunlop, The Many Faces of Administrative 
Adjudication in the European Union, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 144 (2009); David E. 
Shipley, Due Process Rights Before EU Agencies: The Rights of Defense, 37 GA. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 32 (2008) (“The formal commencement of a procedure by the communication of a 
statement of objections triggers the right to be heard . . . .”).  
 127 With the passage of the Lisbon Treaty, the CFI is now entitled the 
“General Court;” however, because the pre-Lisbon decisions and authorities cited here 
refer to the “CFI,” this note will refer to the court by its former name. See Treaty of 
Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, art. 2, O.J. C 306/1, at 43 
(2007). 
 128 EC decisions are subject to judicial review by the CFI on issues of fact and 
law, and further subject to legal review before the ECJ. Carl Baudenbacher, 
Judicialization of European Competition Policy, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 354 
(B. Hawk, ed. 2003); Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126, at 146. 
 129 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126, at 144. 
 130 IAN S. FORRESTER & ASSIMAKIS P. KOMNINOS, AM. BAR ASSOC. EUROPEAN 
UNION ADMIN. LAW PROJECT, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: COMPETITION LAW ADJUDICATION 
63, http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/eu/SectRptAdj-Competition--Komninos_spring2006.pdf. 
 131 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 8, at 88. 
 132 Id. 
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including all legal and natural persons participating in 
economic or commercial activity.133 
Regulation 1/2003 sets forth the rules related to the 
enforcement of Article 101, and delegates enforcement 
responsibility both to the EC through the DG Competition and 
to Member States of the European Union.134 Under this 
regulation, the EC has the authority to “impose on [infringing 
undertakings] any behavioral or structural remedies which are 
proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to 
bring the infringement to an end.”135 The EC is also authorized 
through Regulation 1/2003 to impose penalties—specifically 
and exclusively fines136—on offending undertakings.137 These 
fines have exceeded 13 billion euros over the last 15 years.138 
Finally, under Article 230(1) of the EC Treaty, decisions made 
  
 133 See Simon Holmes & Philipp Girardet, European Union, THE INT’L COMP. 
LEGAL GUIDE TO CARTELS & LENIENCY 66, 66 (2009). 
 134 Regulation No. 1/2003, art. 11-24, O.J. L 1/1, at 10-18 (2003) [hereinafter 
Regulation 1/2003]. 
 135 Id. at 9. However, before the Commission may issue a decision regarding 
an undertaking, it must consult the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and 
Dominant Positions (the “Advisory Committee”), which is comprised of representatives 
of Member States and prepares opinions on draft Commission decisions. The 
Commission must consider the opinions of the Advisory Committee with the “utmost 
account” in preparing a final decision. Id. 
 136 Baudenbacher, supra note 128, at 354. In fact, the Commission has 
asserted its non-criminal character expressly “because it did not want Article 6 of the 
European Human Rights convention to be applied to it.” Id. Under Article 6 of the 
ECHR:  
[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
(a) to be informed promptly . . . of the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be 
given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have 
examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against him; [and] (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter 
if he cannot understand or speak the language of the court. 
Slater et al., supra note 7, at 4 n.10. 
 137 The regulation states that the Commission may impose fines up to 10% of 
the undertaking’s “total turnover” in the previous business year in the event that the 
undertaking has infringed Article 101 or contravened an “interim measure” imposed 
upon the undertaking, or if the undertaking has failed to comply with a commitment it 
has made in response to a preliminary finding of infringement. Regulation 1/2003, 
supra note 134, art. 23, at 16-17. 
 138 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, OFFICIAL STATISTICS ON EC FINES [hereinafter EC 
FINE STATISTICS], available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/ 
statistics.pdf (last updated Oct. 7, 2009). 
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by the EC are subject to appellate judicial review by the CFI 
and ECJ.139 
B. Sources of Oral Evidence in EC Cartel Cases 
The EC utilizes a multifarious approach to investigation 
and evidence-gathering that is heavily influenced by the 
American model.140 While in the past the Commission’s evidence 
was limited, to a large extent, to documentary evidence, its 
modern approach increasingly relies on oral evidence gathered 
from (1) the EC Leniency Program and (2) its investigations. As 
explained below, this modern approach bears heavily on the 
adequacy of EC procedural fairness. 
1. The EC Leniency Program and Paperless 
Applications 
The first source of oral evidence in EC cartel cases 
arises in the form of oral applications for leniency, which were 
introduced in the EC’s 2002 revision to its 1996 Leniency 
Program.141 The program was revised in 2002 and then again in 
2006 “because [the EC] wanted it to be more attractive and . . . 
closer to the American program.”142 The current leniency 
program—outlined in the EC’s “Leniency Notice”—provides 
conditional immunity from fines to the first undertaking that 
approaches the Commission with evidence of cartel activity.143 
This evidence must be in the form of a corporate statement 
that is sufficient to allow the Commission (1) to “carry out a 
targeted inspection in connection with the alleged cartel” 
(“Point 8(a) Immunity”),144 or (2) to “find an infringement of 
  
 139 See Holmes & Girardet, supra note 133, at 67. 
 140 International Cartels Roundtable, supra note 19, at 100. 
 141 Joshua, supra note 26, at 16. 
 142 International Cartels Roundtable, supra note 19, at 100; see WILLIAM E. 
KOVACIC, FTC, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 100: INTO OUR 2ND CENTURY 166 
n.799 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/workshops/ftc100/docs/ftc100rpt.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2010). 
 143 Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel 
Cases, ¶ 8(a), 2006 O.J. (C 298) 18 [hereinafter Commission Notice], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:298:0017:0022:EN:PDF. 
 144 Id. ¶ 8(a). In order to qualify for Point 8(a) Immunity, the applying 
undertaking must approach the Commission before it has “sufficient evidence to adopt 
a decision to carry out an inspection in connection with the alleged cartel or had 
already carried out such an inspection.” Id. ¶ 10. Furthermore, the leniency notice 
provides that an applicant for 8(a) Immunity must provide the Commission with (a) 
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Article [101 TFEU] in connection with the alleged cartel” 
(“Point 8(b) Immunity”).145 Additionally, the Leniency Notice 
provides fine reduction for subsequent applicants that provide 
“significant added value” to the EC’s investigation, defining 
“added value” with reference to “the extent to which the 
evidence provided strengthens, by its very nature and/or its 
level of detail, the Commission’s ability to prove the alleged 
cartel.”146 As in the United States, all applicants must meet a 
series of preconditions designed to ensure cooperation with the 
EC, evidence preservation, and effective and immediate 
withdrawal from the conspiracy.147 
Corporate statements made for leniency purposes may 
be submitted either in written or oral form.148 Oral statements 
were first allowed in the 2002 revision to the Leniency Notice, 
a modification encouraged by American lawyers as a means of 
protecting applicants from U.S. civil antitrust lawsuits brought 
by customers, indirect purchasers, consumers, and others.149 In 
  
evidence in the form of a “corporate statement” and (b) other evidence, including 
contemporaneous evidence of the conspiracy available to the applicant. Id. ¶ 9. 
 145 Id. ¶ 8(b). Where the EC has already initiated an investigation into cartel 
conduct without recourse to a Point 8(a) Immunity applicant, a cartel participant may 
qualify for Point 8(b) Immunity if it is “the first to provide contemporaneous, 
incriminating evidence of the alleged cartel as well as a corporate statement containing 
the kind of information . . . which would enable the Commission to find an 
infringement of Article [101 TFEU].” Id. ¶ 11. 
 146 Id. ¶ 25, at 20. 
 147 Id. ¶ 12, at 18. First, the applicant must cooperate “genuinely, fully, on a 
continuous basis and expeditiously from the time it submits its application throughout 
the Commission’s administrative procedure.” Id. ¶ 12(a). Second, the applicant must 
have ended “its involvement in the alleged cartel immediately following its application, 
except for what would, in the Commission’s view, be reasonably necessary to preserve 
the integrity of the inspections.” Id. ¶ 12(b), at 19. Third, the applicant “must not have 
destroyed, falsified or concealed evidence of the alleged cartel nor disclosed the fact or 
any of the content of its contemplated application, except to other competition 
authorities.” Id. ¶ 12(c). The last requirement outlined in the Leniency Notice concerns 
the applicant’s role within the cartel; namely, the applicant must not have coerced any 
other co-conspirator to join or remain a part of the cartel. Id. ¶ 13. 
 148 Id. ¶ 9(a), at 18 n.2. 
 149 Bertus van Barlingen & Marc Barennes, The European Commission’s 2002 
Leniency Notice in Practice, 3 EUR. COMPETITION NEWSL. 6, 8 (2005) (“[T]he 
Commission allows [oral leniency applications] . . . in order to ensure that by making 
an application under the Commission’s Leniency Notice, undertakings are not worse off 
than non-cooperating cartel members in respect of civil procedures for damages.”); 
Joshua, supra note 26, at 14 (explaining that “[t]he exposure arises from the 
mathematical certainty that any announcement of an antitrust investigation in the US 
will trigger a welter of expensive and burdensome treble damages claims.”); 2003 
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST 120 (ed. Barry Hawk 2004) (As Olivier Guersent, the former 
DG Competition noted, “[W]hat we want to protect from discovery is this very 
incriminating document that the applicants assemble for the Commission, and that is 
basically a roadmap to these documents. . . . We do believe these types of document 
[sic] should not be disclosed in civil trials because if they are, then they unbalance the 
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this so-called “paperless” procedure, the applicant or its 
attorneys may recite the relevant facts required for leniency 
onto a tape, which becomes “original evidence” added to the 
investigation file.150 After the applicant delivers its oral 
testimony, it will be “granted the opportunity to check the 
technical accuracy of the recording, which will be available at 
the Commission’s premises[,] and to correct the substance of 
their oral statements within a given time limit.”151 The EC 
shields the oral statement transcripts from discovery during 
the course of the investigation, and maintains unattested 
transcripts as an “internal resource” such that they are not 
discoverable either with the Statement of Objections or to civil 
plaintiffs.152 However, while protected from civil discovery, 
these oral statements are considered “evidence” in cartel cases 
against co-conspirators,153 a policy recognized both by the CFI154 
and by the EC.155 Furthermore, and as more fully explicated 
below, Regulation No. 1/2003 allows EC competition case teams 
to “interview any natural or legal person who consents to be 
interviewed for the purpose of collecting information relating to 
the subject-matter of an investigation,” including interviews 
during the course of the leniency application process.156 
However, these interviews are strictly voluntary, and the EC 
may not require individuals to give testimony under oath.157 
  
trial extremely severely, and it acts as an extreme disincentive to apply for immunity 
in the European Union.”). 
 150 van Barlingen & Berennes, supra note 149, at 10. Originally, however, the 
oral statements were designed solely to gather “dawn raid sufficient” information. 
Julian Joshua, The European Cartel Enforcement Regime Post-Modernization: How is it 
Working?, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1247, 1262 (2006) (“In the EC, however, the oral 
process has slipped from the provision of information sufficient to trigger a raid—that 
is, the information gathered is used as no more than a road map to the evidence—to 
being treated by the Commission as itself conclusive evidence of the violation.”). 
 151 Commission Notice, supra note 143, ¶ 32. 
 152 Joshua, supra note 26, at 15. 
 153 van Barlingen & Berennes, supra note 149, at 8; Joshua, supra note 26, at 17. 
 154 JFE Eng’g Corp. v. Comm’n, Joined Cases T-67/00, T-68/00, T-71/00 & T-
78/00, 2004 E.C.R. II-2514, 2587 ¶ 192 (noting that “no provision or any general 
principle of Community law prohibits the Commission from relying, as against an 
undertaking, on statements made by other incriminated undertakings”). Specifically 
related to oral statements, the court—deciding the issue based on the 1996 Leniency 
Notice—stated that informational evidence “need not necessarily be provided in 
documentary form.” Tokai Carbon Co. Ltd. v. Comm’n, Joined Cases T-236/01, T-
239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 & T-252/01, 2004 E.C.R. II-1181, ¶ 431. 
 155 van Barlingen & Berennes, supra note 149, at 9. 
 156 Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 19(1), at 14. 
 157 BEST PRACTICES, supra note 120, at 12; Koen Lenaerts, Some Thoughts on 
Evidence and Procedure in European Community Competition Law, 30 FORDHAM INT’L 
L. J. 1463, 1469 (2007); Council Regulation No. 773, art. 3, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 20. 
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Thus, the leniency program involves two species of oral 
evidence, the applications and the interviews, neither of which 
is sworn or subject to cross-examination.158 
2. Investigation and Oral Interviews 
The second source of oral evidence in EC cartel cases 
arises from investigations into alleged violations of European 
competition laws, as authorized under Regulation 1/2003.159 
First, where the EC has reason to believe that there is a 
distortion or restriction in the common market, it may 
investigate any specific industry or market with respect to the 
apparent distortion or restriction, and may request any 
necessary information from undertakings, including 
information related to “all agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices.”160 Additionally, the EC may, by request or decision, 
“require undertakings and associations of undertakings to 
provide all necessary information” to assist with the 
investigation.161 In the event that an undertaking provides false 
or misleading information, or does not provide the requested 
information within the prescribed time limit, the undertaking 
may face a fine of up to 1% of its “total turnover in the 
preceding business year . . . .”162  
In practice, a team led by a DG Competition case 
manager will conduct the investigation into the alleged 
violations, which may include either a document request or a 
“dawn raid” on a targeted business.163 Increasingly, 
investigations are spurred by leniency applications, which 
require “dawn raid sufficient” evidence.164 During the course of 
  
 158 Lenaerts, supra note 157, at 1468-69 (“The Commission is entitled to rely 
on these submissions in order to establish the existence of an infringement. Since the 
principle is that the evaluation of evidence should be unfettered, this type of evidence 
is admissible under Community competition law. However, in the administrative 
procedure, the Commission does not have the power ‘to compel persons to give evidence 
under oath.’”) (quoting Rhône-Poulenc SA, 1991 E.C.R. II-867, II-954) (Vesterdorf, J.). 
 159 Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 17-22, at 13-16. 
 160 Id. art. 17, at 13. 
 161 Id. art. 18(1), at 13. 
 162 Id. art. 23(1)(a)-(b), at 16. 
 163 A dawn raid is an early morning, “on-the-spot” investigation of a business 
office or private residence conducted by EC officials—at times with the assistance of 
law enforcement from the member state—pursuant to Regulation 1/2003 Articles 18 
through 21. See Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126, at 156; Imran Aslam & Michael 
Ramsden, EC Dawn Raids: A Human Rights Violation?, 5 COMPETITION L. REV. 61, 65-
67 (2008); Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 18-21, at 13-16. 
 164 Joshua, supra note 9, at 4. 
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an investigation, “the Commission may interview any natural 
or legal person who consents to be interviewed for the purpose 
of collecting information relating to the subject-matter of an 
investigation.”165 Further, the case team may ask individuals to 
provide voluntary oral explanations of the documentary 
evidence it collects in connection with the dawn raids,166 which 
may include searches of businesses, residences, and 
automobiles.167 The testimonial evidence gathered in these 
interviews and explanations may be used as evidence in the 
Statement of Objections, and is not sworn or subject to cross-
examination.168 
C. Procedural Safeguards in the EC 
In the event that the DG Competition case team 
discovers violations in the course of an investigation, it may 
seek approval from the Legal Service and the Competition 
Commissioner, as well as a committee of European Member 
States, to outline a “Statement of Objections,” which includes 
(1) the charges against the undertaking and (2) the time limit 
for the undertaking to respond to the allegations.169 Upon the 
filing of a Statement of Objections, the undertaking is afforded 
a series of procedural rights, including (1) the right to access 
the Commission’s file against the undertaking170 and (2) the 
right to be heard in writing or at an oral hearing.171 
1. The Right of Access to File 
Parties subject to a Statement of Objections are 
“entitled to have access to the Commission’s file,” excepting 
business secrets and confidential information such as internal 
documents prepared by the EC and Member States of the EU.172 
The right of access was first articulated in Solvay v. 
Commission, in which the CFI explained the purpose of the 
right; namely, “to enable addressees of statements of objections 
  
 165 Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 19(1), at 14. 
 166 Lenaerts, supra note 157, at 1469. 
 167 Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 20-21, at 14-15. 
 168 Id. 
 169 BEST PRACTICES, supra note 120, at 18-19; Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 
126, at 156. 
 170 Shipley, supra note 1, at 39-43. 
 171 Id. at 36-39. 
 172 Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 27(2), at 19. 
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to examine evidence in the Commission’s file so that they are in 
a position effectively to express their views on the conclusions 
reached by the Commission in its statement of objections on 
the basis of that evidence.”173 Furthermore, the Court outlined 
the “equality of arms” principle, which states that the 
information available to the Commission and the undertaking 
at issue must be equal.174  
2. The Right to Be Heard 
The right to be heard was first outlined in Transocean 
Marine Paint Ass’n v. Commission, where the CFI noted that “a 
person whose interests are perceptibly affected by a [d]ecision 
taken by a public authority must be given the opportunity to 
make his point of view known.”175 Later, in Hoffmann-La Roche 
& Co. v. Commission, the CFI generalized the procedural rights 
of undertakings, stating that “the undertakings concerned 
must have been afforded the opportunity during the 
administrative procedure to make known their views on the 
truth and relevance of the facts and circumstances alleged and 
on the documents used by the Commission to support its claim” 
of infringement.176 The right to be heard is now formalized in 
Regulation 1/2003, which requires that, prior to making a 
decision with respect to an alleged violation of TFEU Article 
101, the Commission must give the alleged violators an 
“opportunity to be heard” on the matters set forth in the 
Statement of Objections.177  
Oral hearings are conducted by a Hearing Officer 
independent of the investigative team.178 The CFI has held that 
  
 173 Case T-30/91, Solvay SA v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. II-1775, 1802. 
 174 Shipley, supra note 1, at 40.  
 
175
 Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Ass’n v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 1062, 
1079-80. 
 176 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-Law Roche & Co. v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 512. 
 177 The hearing procedures themselves are more fully explained in a 
subsequent, clarifying regulation, Regulation 773/2004, which states that the parties 
must be given an “opportunity to develop their arguments at an oral hearing” prior to 
the Commission consulting with the Advisory Committee. Commission Regulation No. 
773/2004, art. 12, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 21 (EC) [hereinafter Regulation 773/2004]; 
Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 12, at 19; Joined Cases 100-103/80, SA Musique 
Diffusion Francaise v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 1825, 1881-84; Shipley, supra note 1, at 
36.  
 178 Regulation 773/2004, supra note 177, art. 14(1), at 21 (“Hearings shall be 
conducted by a Hearing Officer in full independence.”); Committee Decision of 23 May 
2001 on the Terms of Reference of Hearing Officers in Certain Competition Proceedings, 
2001 O.J. (L 162) 21 (“The conduct of administrative proceedings should therefore be 
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these hearings are “adversarial” in nature, and each hearing 
generally follows these steps: (1) the Commission presents its 
case, (2) the defending parties and any relevant third parties 
present their case in response to the statement of objections, (3) 
representatives of the Member States and the Commission may 
ask questions regarding the arguments presented in the 
defending parties’ presentations, and (4) the Hearing Officer 
may provide the parties with an opportunity to make brief, 
concluding remarks relating to issues previously discussed 
during the hearing.179 Additionally, EC competition hearings 
are recorded.180 
During its presentation to the Commission, a defending 
party has the right to submit testimony in response to the 
Statement of Objections, may call on its own fact and expert 
witnesses, and may submit questions to the Hearing Officer, 
who then has the discretion to put the questions to Commission 
witnesses.181 However, unlike in adversarial systems such as 
the United States, parties in hearings before the European 
Commission “do not have the right to cross-examine the 
Commission, other parties (co-defendants) or third persons 
whose testimony is heard at the hearing,” and “[t]he 
Commission does not cross-examine the parties, but it may 
question them after the presentation with respect to their oral 
  
entrusted to an independent person experienced in competition matters who has the 
integrity necessary to contribute to the objectivity, transparency and efficiency of those 
proceedings.”). As the EC states:  
The hearing officer brings a new pair of eyes to trade proceedings and is fully 
impartial. As an official of DG Trade experienced in trade issues, he has a 
thorough knowledge of the system from the inside, but is not involved in 
ongoing investigations or conducting trade proceedings himself. The hearing 
officer is independent from the Commission investigators and receives no 
instructions from them about his substantial role.  
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR TRADE, EUROPEAN COMM’N, HEARING OFFICER PRACTICAL 
INFORMATION, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/hearing-
officer/practical-information/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2010); see also 
Forrester, supra note 7, at 834. 
 179 See DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR COMPETITION, EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE 
HEARING OFFICERS: GUIDANCE ON PROCEDURES OF THE HEARING OFFICERS IN PROCEEDINGS 
RELATING TO ARTICLES 101 AND 102 TFEU (EX- ARTICLES 81 AND 82 EC) 11-15 (2010) 
[hereinafter DG COMPETITION, THE HEARING OFFICERS], http://ec.europa. 
eu/competition/consultations/2010_best_practices/hearing_officers.pdf; see also Forrester & 
Komninos, supra note 130, at 61; Regulation 773/2004, supra note 177, art. 14, at 21-22. 
 180 THE HEARING OFFICER, EUROPEAN COMM’N, INFORMATION ON THE ORAL 
HEARING TO WHICH YOU ARE INVITED 3, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
hearing_officers/info2.pdf (last visited June 26, 2010). 
 181 Forrester & Komninos, supra note 130, at 61. 
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submissions.”182 After the hearing, the Hearing Officer is 
responsible for preparing an interim and final report183 for the 
College of Commissioners, which then decides whether to 
impose penalties on the defending undertaking.184 Thus, while 
“[t]he procedure in [EC competition cases] comes very close to 
the full evidentiary hearing of the type required by . . . 
Goldberg v. Kelly,” the lack of cross-examination—especially 
given the increasing use of oral evidence—highlights the 
inadequacy of the present safeguards.185 
III. TRENDS IN EC CARTEL ENFORCEMENT TOWARD A 
CRIMINAL AND ADVERSARIAL MODEL, AND THE FAILURE 
TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
The current state of EC cartel enforcement, as outlined 
above, represents the latest stage in an “important 
evolutionary process” with respect to its administrative 
procedure—one that has brought it strikingly close to the 
American model and now demands an attendant right to 
confrontation.186 First, as investigations have become more 
aggressive and fines have increased, the EC cartel enforcement 
regime has become increasingly “criminalized.”187 Second, EC 
procedures have become increasingly “judicialized,” adopting 
structures to provide independence of decision-making and to 
sever the oft-criticized role of the EC as investigator, 
prosecutor, and judge.188 Third, as the EC has developed its 
procedures, there has been an increase in procedural rights 
  
 182 Id. at 63. 
 183 These reports relate to both procedural and substantive issues, including 
whether the rights of defense were respected in the hearing and the Hearing Officer’s 
substantive observations on the course of the proceedings. DG COMPETITION, THE 
HEARING OFFICERS, supra note 179, at 16-17. 
 184 Governance Statement of the European Commission 2 (May 30, 2007), 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/doc/governance_statement_en.pdf. 
 185 Julian M. Joshua, The Right to be Heard in EEC Competition Procedures, 
15 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 16, 57 (1991). 
 186 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126, at 143-44; Philip Marsden & Peter 
Whelan, Re-Examining Trans-Atlantic Similarities and Divergences in Substantive and 
Procedural Competition Law, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 23, 23 (2009). 
 187 Forrester, supra note 7, at 834 (“We have come a long way since the early 
days of EC competition law, when cases were carefully picked, decisions were few and 
penalties were modest. The regime had been set up in 1962, it was a relatively obscure 
topic, and the fines were not confiscatory though they could, in theory, be painful.”); see 
also Aslam & Ramsden, supra note 7, at 61-62; Slater, Thomas & Waelbroeck, supra 
note 7, at 4, 11. 
 188 Forrester, supra note 7, at 830; see also Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126, 
at 157; Lenaerts, supra note 157, at 1474; Shipley, supra note 1, at 14. 
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afforded to private parties before the EC.189 However, the 
advent of oral leniency applications in the EC in 2002 and the 
increasing use of oral evidence in EC competition proceedings 
raise a number of questions about the sufficiency of extant 
procedural protections.190 The credibility of oral leniency 
applicants is especially lacking because those individuals and 
corporations have a strong interest in embellishing the role of 
co-conspirators while minimizing the extent of their own 
participation in the cartel.191 Furthermore, the lack of 
procedures for confrontation and cross-examination in EC 
proceedings threatens the integrity of the entire fact-finding 
process,192 since “hearsay accounts given by lawyers fall short of 
any generally accepted evidential standards, especially if they 
are the only proof adduced by the Commission.”193 While some 
commentators argue that the protections in the European 
Union adequately provide procedural fairness,194 others are not 
convinced.195 To secure procedural rights for corporations, and 
in light of the implementation of the oral leniency application, 
this note proposes that the EC should adopt a Crawford v. 
Washington-based approach196 to confrontational rights. 
Adopting this approach will serve a vital, legitimating function 
in a system where policy changes have outpaced procedural 
adaptations. 
A. Criminalization of EC Cartel Enforcement 
The EC’s cartel enforcement regime has appropriated 
elements of American cartel enforcement since its inception.197 
  
 189 Francesca Bignami, Creating European Rights: National Values and 
Supranational Interests, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241, 279 (2005); Lenaerts, supra note 
157, at 1474; Wils, supra note 19, at 128. 
 190 Joshua, supra note 9, at 1; Lenaerts, supra note 157, at 1474-94 
(describing existent procedural protections in European Community Competition Law). 
 191 Forrester, supra note 7, at 833 (“Leniency applicants have a clear interest 
in showing serious wrongdoing by their competitors. The juicier the information they 
provide, the more chance they have of being deemed to have provided ‘significant added 
value’ and obtaining a reduction in their fine, or total immunity; and, in the process, 
they will have created big trouble for their competitors.”); Joshua, supra note 9, at 7. 
 192 Joshua, supra note 9, at 6. 
 193 Id. at 16. 
 194 Shipley, supra note 1, at 48. 
 195 Joshua, supra note 9, at 1. 
 196 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 197 Nicholas Green QC, The Road to Conviction—The Criminalisation of 
Cartel Law, in 2003 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 000, 28 (B. Hawk, ed. 2004) (though 
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When the European Union crafted the Treaty of Rome198 in 
1957, it “took as its inspiration for Articles 85 and 86EC, 
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.”199 This influence extends 
to the means of investigation employed by the EC in cartel 
enforcement, as well as the ever-increasing fines that it levies 
on violators.200 
1. Criminalized Investigations 
Over time, the European Commission has adopted many 
of the investigatory techniques utilized by criminal 
enforcement regimes like the United States, and sometimes 
utilizes powers that go beyond those criminal systems.201 First, 
the most invasive investigatory power of the European 
Commission is the “dawn raid.”202 Under Regulation 1/2003, the 
Commission has sweeping authority to conduct searches of 
businesses, private residences, and private automobiles, 
subject only to minimal oversight by national courts.203 
Furthermore, when the Commission effectuates these searches, 
it often utilizes the law enforcement mechanisms—including 
search warrants—and police personnel of the EU Member 
States.204 Some commentators have intimated that these 
techniques were inspired by the U.S. antitrust authorities’ 
successful use of criminal search warrants to retrieve business 
records from the homes of cartel participants.205 Irrespective of 
their source, however, it is clear that the increasingly 
aggressive EC investigations are closely aligned with criminal 
law enforcement techniques used in the United States.206 
Second, the Commission adopted a leniency program—a 
tool that had traditionally been reserved for only the most 
  
Green notes that the provisions were not “slavish[ly]” plagiarized from the Sherman 
Act). 
 198 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-II), in TREATIES ESTABLISHING 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off’l Pub. Off. 1987). 
 199 Green QC, supra note 197, at 28. 
 200 Chavez, supra note 30, at 824-25; Wils, supra note 19, at 14. 
 201 See Aslam & Ramsdem, supra note 163, at 65-67. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id.; see also Holmes & Girardet, supra note 133, at 68. 
 204 Explanatory Note to an Authorisation to Conduct an Inspection in Execution 
of a Commission Decision Under Article 20(4) of Council Regulation No 1/2003 (2008), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/explanatory_note.pdf. 
 205 Chavez, supra note 30, at 825. 
 206 Aslam & Ramsden, supra note 7, at 64-67. 
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serious criminal conspiracies—in large measure as a result of 
the successful American experiment with its program in the 
criminal context.207 The EC further undertook to bring its 
leniency program in line with the US model through its 2002 
and 2006 revisions, in which the most notable amendments 
involved the incorporation of confidentiality provisions and the 
oral leniency procedure.208 These provisions, designed to protect 
against disclosure in American civil litigation, brought the 
program “closer to the U.S. regime that is based on oral 
statements rather than written documents.”209 However, while 
the American system safeguards defendants from the use of 
these oral statements in trial through its entrenched 
procedural defense rights, the oral statements in the EC 
procedure only seemed to create “a number of new 
problems/issues,” including: (1) “issues related to the 
evidentiary value of recorded oral statements in Community 
antitrust procedures” and (2) “issues related to the modalities 
of exercise of the rights of defence of the other cartel 
members.”210 
2. Penalties Exhibit Criminal Qualities 
The recent modernization efforts in EC cartel 
enforcement were “triggered by the need to restore the 
effectiveness of the fight against secret unlawful agreements.”211 
One of the most significant ways the EC did this was to adopt 
“a considerable increase in the level of fines imposed by the 
Commission.”212 A CFI judge has noted that EC fines “have a 
criminal law character,” such that, increasingly “parties’ 
submissions can only be understood with the help of the 
terminology and concepts used in criminal law and 
procedure.”213 While EC decisions against cartel participants 
between 1969 and 1995 totaled 3.329 million euros (comprising 
eighty cartel decisions), enforcement between 1996 and the end 
  
 207 Wils, supra note 19, at 127. 
 208 International Cartels Roundtable, supra note 19, at 100. 
 209 Olivier Guersent, The Fight Against Secret Horizontal Agreement in the EC 
Competition Policy, in 2003 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 43, 54 (B. Hawk, ed. 2004); 
International Cartels Roundtable, supra note 19, at 100. 
 210 Guersent, supra note 209, at 54. 
 211 Id. at 45. 
 212 Id. at 47; see also Marsden & Whelan, supra note 186, at 23. 
 213 Case T-1/89, Rhone-Poulenc SA v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. II-867, available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61989F0001:EN:NOT. 
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of 2003 totaled 3.45 billion euros (comprising thirty decisions), 
with fines exceeding 9 billion euros for the 2004 to 2009 
timeframe (comprising 243 decisions).214 This trend toward 
astronomical fines exhibits the increasingly punitive and quasi-
criminal character of EC cartel enforcement, heightening the 
“relevance of general principles of substantive criminal law” 
and its attendant procedural safeguards.215 
Furthermore, Regulation 1/2003 provides for indirect 
criminal penalties through the operation of the cartel 
enforcement regimes of the Member States. Under Article 5 of 
Regulation 1/2003, “[t]he competition authorities of the 
Member States shall have the power to apply Articles [101] and 
[102] of the [TFEU] in individual cases,” and they may take 
decisions “imposing fines, periodic penalty payments or any 
other penalty provided for in their national law.”216 As a result 
of this broad penalty authorization, Member States may levy 
criminal sentences on corporations and individuals alike, and 
such penalties have been extended in Ireland, Estonia, and the 
United Kingdom.217 Thus, while these penalties are not directly 
imposed or adjudicated by the Commission, their availability 
through the Member States suggest that the Commission is 
willing to accept the appropriateness of criminal consequences 
for violations of EC competition laws. 
3. EC Cartel Hearings Exhibit Important Adversarial 
Qualities 
At the procedural level, the trend in EU cartel 
enforcement has been one toward a quasi-criminal, adversarial 
system, replete with many—but not all—of the rights found in 
adversarial systems.218 First, although the CFI has declined to 
conclude that the Commission constitutes a “tribunal,” it 
contains many of the same characteristics.219 Namely, it (1) is 
established by law, (2) is permanent, (3) exercises compulsory 
  
 214 Guersent, supra note 209, at 48; see also EC FINE STATISTICS, supra note 138. 
 215 Lenaerts, supra note 157, at 1485. 
 216 Regulation 1/2003, supra note 134, art. 5, at 8-9; see also Wils, supra note 
19, at 129. 
 217 Wils, supra note 19, at 130. 
 218 Marsden & Whelan, supra note 186, at 40; Wils, supra note 19, at 15; 
Baudenbacher, supra note 128, at 354; Julian Joshua, Attitudes to Anti-Trust 
Enforcement in the EU and US: Dodging the Traffic Warden, or Respecting the Law? 
(1995), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1995_044_en.html. 
 219 Forrester, supra note 7 at 831; Shipley, supra note 1, at 36. 
1522 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:4 
jurisdiction, (4) carries out inter partes proceedings,220 (5) 
applies the rule of law with evidentiary standards,221 and (6) is, 
in certain important ways, independent.222 For example, the role 
of the Hearing Officer, who conducts EC competition hearings 
and files reports regarding compliance with procedural rules, 
severs the relationship between the investigating case team 
and the decision-making College of Commissioners.223 This 
division of roles creates delineated prosecutorial and judicial 
functions, heightening the adversarial nature of the hearings 
and providing “an independent guarantor of the fundamental 
procedural rights of all parties.”224 Furthermore, the use of oral 
evidence in EC hearings has increased, which, while 
uncommon in inquisitorial hearings, stands as a hallmark of 
Western adversarial systems.225 Based on the trend toward an 
adversarial system, it is not surprising that there has been a 
concomitant shift toward greater procedural rights in the EC. 
B. Trend toward Greater Procedural Rights in EC Cartel 
Cases 
Undertakings in EC competition hearings were afforded 
very little by way of procedural rights at the inception of the 
EC.226 However, over time there has been a significant increase 
in the “rights of defence” for targeted undertakings, including 
the right of “access to file” and the “right to be heard.”227 
  
 220 See sources cited supra note 219. 
 221 Guidance on Procedures, supra note 178, at 4. (“The Commission has to 
conduct its competition proceedings fairly and objectively while respecting the parties’ 
procedural rights. The Hearing Officers are, first of all, guardians of fair proceedings 
before the Commission. They safeguard the rights of defence of undertakings subject to 
proceedings relating to Articles 101 and 102 (ex- articles 81 and 82) as well as the 
procedural rights of . . . all . . . parties to the proceedings.”); Regulation No. 1/2003, 
supra note 134. 
 222 DG COMPETITION, THE HEARING OFFICERS, supra note 179, at 5-6.; 
Baudenbacher, supra note 128, at 355; Regulation No. 773/2004, supra note 179, art. 
14(1), at 21 (“Hearings shall be conducted by a Hearing Officer in full independence.”). 
 223 DG COMPETITION, THE HEARING OFFICERS, supra note 178, at 6. The College of 
Commissioners is comprised of representatives of member states who are “completely 
independent in the performance of their duties[,] . . . neither seek[ing] nor tak[ing] 
instructions from any government or from any other body.” Id. Governance Statement of the 
European Commission 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/doc/governance_ 
statement_en.pdf; see also Regulation No. 773/2004, supra note 177, art. 14(1), at 21. 
 224 Baudenbacher, supra note 128, at 356. 
 225 Id. at 355. 
 226 Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126, 143. 
 227 At first, the accession of rights was inspired in part by intense pressure 
from the United Kingdom, which, having joined the EU, wanted to protect the 
fundamental rights of its citizenry. Id. at 143-46. 
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However, these procedural rights have almost exclusively 
focused on rights exercised before and after the EC hearing, 
and do not include a right to cross-examine witnesses.228 
Certainly, in a purely inquisitorial system, confrontation is 
much less necessary, both because an inquisitorial approach 
takes power out of the hands of the individual parties and 
because live, testimonial evidence bears much less weight than 
documentary evidence.229 In the EC, however, the increasing 
use of oral testimony and adversarial postures creates a 
disjuncture between its substantive policies and procedural 
protections.230 As such, where the starting place and crux of 
high-stakes cartel enforcement is increasingly unsworn, ex 
parte oral testimony used explicitly as evidence of collusive 
conduct, procedural rights must include a right of 
confrontation.231 
IV. TOWARD A RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION FOR EC 
COMPETITION HEARINGS 
While trends in EC cartel enforcement have kept pace 
with global cartel enforcement with respect to investigation 
and punishment, the EC has not made parallel strides in the 
area of procedural protections.232 One fundamental right above 
all is lacking in EC competition procedure: the right of 
confrontation. The American constitutional right of a criminal 
defendant to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him 
provides a useful model for managing oral testimony that 
would bring necessary procedural fairness to the EC cartel 
enforcement regime.233 
  
 228 Forrester, supra note 7, at 831-32; Joshua, supra note 9, at 6-7; Philip 
Lowe, Director General, DG Competition, Speech at the CRA Conference on Economic 
Developments in Competition Law: Due Process in Antitrust, at 7 (Dec. 9, 2009), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2009_19_en.pdf. 
 229 Lenaerts, supra note 157, at 1469. 
 230 Forrester, supra note 7, at 831, 833. 
 231 Joshua, supra note 26, at 16 (“[H]earsay accounts given by lawyers fall 
short of any generally accepted evidential standards, especially if they are the only 
proof adduced by the Commission.”). 
 232 Marsden & Whelan, supra note 186, at 40. 
 233 For the purposes of this note, the Sixth Amendment Right of 
Confrontation, and not the Due Process Clause (or Federal Trade Commission 
administrative procedure), provides the correct analogy, based on the de facto 
criminalization of cartel conduct in the EC and the increasingly formal and adversarial 
nature of EC competition hearings. 
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A. The Necessity of a Right of Confrontation for EC 
Competition Hearings 
At the dawn of the adoption of the 2002 Leniency 
Notice, which first allowed for oral leniency applications, Emil 
Paulis, the former Director responsible for Policy and Strategic 
Support at DG Competition, stated that because “EU 
administrative proceedings [are] centered on an exchange of 
written arguments[,] . . . it does not serve the parties to cross-
examine the Commission.”234 Further, in 1991 the ECJ held 
that—in the context of anonymous documents—the 
Commission need only perform “an overall assessment of a 
document’s probative value” to determine admissibility.235 
However, because the evidence used in EC Competition 
hearings is now so heavily based on oral testimony, the 
document-based procedure of the past can no longer be credibly 
relied upon as a justification for the denial of confrontational 
rights.236 
First, the use of oral leniency applications in the EC as 
evidence of cartel conduct raises many of the hearsay and 
credibility issues against which cross-examination is designed 
to protect.237 Because cartels are inherently secretive, the 
possibility of ferreting out and establishing infringement 
absent a confession or oral explanation of incriminating 
documents is often remote.238 At the same time, however, there 
is a strong incentive for individuals and corporations to 
embellish the conduct of co-conspirators in the leniency 
application process in order to achieve “significant added 
value,”239 and there is no direct right to test the accuracy of 
those statements in EC oral hearings.240 
  
 234 Emil Paulis, Checks and Balances in the EU Antitrust Enforcement System, 
in 2002 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 381, 385 (B. Hawk ed., 2003). 
 235 Case T-1/89, Rhone-Poulenc SA v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. II-867, at II-954, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61989F0001: 
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 236 Joshua, supra note 150, at 1262. 
 237 Sklansky, supra note 72, at 1646 (“Introducing evidence of an out-of-court 
accusation from someone who never testifies raises some of the same concerns as 
examining a witness outside the defendant’s presence: in either case the defendant has 
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 238 Van Barlingen & Barennes, supra note 149, at 9; Joshua, supra note 9, at 
1, 3, 5-6. 
 239 Forrester, supra note 7, 833; Joshua, supra note 9, at 5-6. The incentive to 
embellish is two-fold. First, an undertaking applying for leniency has an incentive to 
provide evidence of its co-conspirator’s bad acts while downplaying its own role to avoid 
being viewed as a “ring-leader,” which would prevent it from receiving leniency. 
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In this way, the use of oral testimony and oral leniency 
applications as evidence absent a right to confrontation or 
cross-examination is analogous to the obtainment and use of 
the untested, ex parte statements of Lord Cobham in Sir Walter 
Raleigh’s trial—a practice viewed as anathematic to a fair trial 
in common law systems.241 Continuing the analogy to the 
Raleigh trial, in EC procedure, the leniency-seeking co-
conspirator will have prepared an out-of-court confession under 
intense pressure and with dubious accuracy, and the accused 
has no procedural right to compel the presence of the co-
conspirator or to cross-examine the accusatory witnesses.242 
Additionally, in both cases the evil arises based in part upon an 
incompatible hybridization of adversarial and inquisitorial 
legal systems.243 Moreover, as demonstrated in the Stolt-Nielsen 
case, co-conspirators in the context of cartel enforcement may—
and often will—lie in exchange for leniency or, in the case of 
also-rans, in retaliation for their co-conspirator’s admissions to 
competition authorities.244 In fact, the role of the government 
witnesses in the Stolt-Nielsen case is not unlike the position of 
the “also ran” leniency applicants in the EC, since both had or 
have a strong incentive to shade co-conspirator conduct in the 
least favorable light.245 Therefore, given the need to utilize oral 
evidence in cartel cases and the trend toward adversarial and 
criminal cartel enforcement in the EC, the fairest solution is to 
implement procedural reforms that would provide a right of 
confrontation in EC competition hearings. 
  
Second, in the context of “also-ran” undertakings, there is a heightened incentive to 
provide as much evidence of anticompetitive behavior as possible, since the level of fine 
reduction is tied to both the quantity and quality of the information provided. 2006 O.J. 
(C 298) 17, 20 ¶ 23-26 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. 
do?uri=OJ:C:2006:298:0017:0022:EN:PDF.  
 240 Forrester, supra note 7, at 833; Joshua, supra note 9, at 6-7. 
 241 Sklansky, supra note 72. 
 242 Forrester, supra note 7, at 833; Sklansky, supra note 72. 
 243 In Raleigh’s trial, the adoption of inquisitorial practices in the English 
common law system prevented Raleigh from receiving a fair trial, whereas the current 
failure arises from the adoption of increasingly criminal and adversarial procedures 
without affording the accused fundamental rights. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 44-45 (2004); Asimow & Dunlop, supra note 126, at 143; Forrester, supra note 7, at 
833-36. 
 244 United States v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 524 F. Supp. 2d 609, 623-24 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 245 Id. 
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B. Proposals for Achieving Procedural Fairness in the EC 
While the need for a right to confrontation within the 
EC is recognized by many, one remaining question is how the 
right should be introduced into the procedural scheme. First, 
some commentators call for an explicit criminalization of cartel 
conduct in the EC,246 which they view as a more effective means 
of both deterring cartel conduct and garnering procedural 
rights for targeted undertakings.247 Second, some contend that 
the inherent criminal nature of cartel conduct justifies an 
extension of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”) procedural protections, which include cross-
examination, to the EC through the reviewing courts.248 Third, 
others suggest reform from within the EC as a part of a 
fundamental overhaul of EC procedure without direct reference 
to the ECHR.249 However, based on the EC apprehension of and 
distaste for these solutions, none are likely to be 
implemented.250 Instead, the best solution is to provide for a 
right of an undertaking subject to a Statement of Objections to 
confront and cross-examine any witness who provides ex parte 
oral testimony that the EC intends to use as evidence of a 
violation of the competition laws. 
  
 246 Despite a clear trend toward criminalization of EC cartel law, Regulation 
1/2003 explicitly states that decisions of the Commission to impose fines for violations 
of Article 101(1) “shall not be of a criminal law nature.” Regulation 1/2003, supra note 
134, art. 23, at 16-17; see also, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 
101, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 88-89, available at http://eur-lex.europa. 
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN:PDF. 
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note 7, at 4; Peter Whelan, A Principled Argument for Personal Criminal Sanctions as 
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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPETITION CASES (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann et al. eds., 
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1. The European Convention on Human Rights 
Some commentators have argued that EC cartel 
enforcement already includes significant hallmarks of criminal 
enforcement such that it should be subject to the procedural 
safeguards of the ECHR, which includes a right to cross-
examination.251 According to this theory, because the ECJ “has 
always indicated its willingness to follow the case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’),”252 and because 
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty requires EU compliance 
with the ECHR,253 the Commission’s procedures should square 
with Article 6 of the ECHR, leaving “the adjudicating function 
in antitrust cases to . . . a [competition specific] ‘judicial panel’ 
attached to the CFI.”254 Other commentators have argued for a 
less institutionally disruptive ECHR-based solution, under 
which the hearings will be mandatory in order to ensure ECHR 
compliance, and the hearing officer will be elevated to the role 
of finder of fact and law.255 
However, the call for judicial extension of the ECHR to 
EC cartel conduct is an ineffective and ultimately implausible 
solution. First, the European Union does not currently have the 
desire to formally criminalize cartel conduct.256 Further, 
because the hearings themselves were specifically designed to 
avoid ECHR application, any such modification will likely 
require outside introduction from the courts—as well as 
wholesale restructuring of EC competition procedure—which is 
impracticable.257 Additionally, the relevant courts have held 
that because the EC Commission is not a formal “tribunal” as 
defined under the ECHR, it is not subject to its procedural 
requirements.258 Finally, even if the levels of fines in EC 
hearings are “criminal” under the ECHR, commentators have 
noted that EC procedure is nonetheless compatible with Article 
6 because the fines lie outside of the “hard core of criminal 
  
 251 Forrester, supra note 7, at 828-29; see also Slater et al., supra note 7, at 4. 
 252 Slater et al., supra note 7, at 3, 26 (noting that case law from the ECtHR 
has held that “[a]n oral, and public, hearing constitutes a fundamental principle 
enshrined in Article 6 § 1”). 
 253 Forrester, supra note 7, at 822. 
 254 Slater et al., supra note 7, at 46. 
 255 Forrester, supra note 7, at 841-43. 
 256 Marsden & Whelan, supra note 186, at 25. 
 257 Forrester, supra note 7, at 831. 
 258 Joined Cases 100-103/80, SA Musique Diffusion Francaise v. Comm’n, 
1983 E.C.R. 1825, 1881-84. 
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law,” and therefore need not meet its stringent procedural 
requirements.259 Thus, a judicial extension of the ECHR is an 
inapt method for achieving procedural fairness in EC 
competition hearings. 
2. Holistic Reform 
Julian Joshua, former Deputy Head of the Cartel Unit 
of DG Competition, has seen first-hand the consequences of the 
2002 EC procedural modernization efforts, and has developed a 
solution involving fundamental procedural reform within EC 
competition proceedings. In 1995, prior to the implementation 
of Regulation 1/2003 and the leniency program, he contended 
that the EC provided sufficient procedural safeguards.260 
However, after the implementation of the leniency reforms in 
2002, he began to advocate for a “bold and ‘holistic’ solution . . . 
encompassing the whole scope of the enforcement process,” 
both to improve the leniency program261 and to protect the “due 
process” rights of implicated parties.262  
First, where reliability is at issue, Joshua asserts that 
“contemporaneous documentary evidence” should be given 
more weight than statements that parties make during the 
course of proceedings, including oral corporate statements.263 
Second, those statements made for the purpose of obtaining 
leniency should be viewed with particular caution, requiring a 
  
 259 Wouter P.J. Wils, The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial 
Review and the ECHR, 33 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 5, 17 (2010) 
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requirements of Article 6 ECHR are different for, on the one hand, the ‘hard core of 
criminal law’, and, on the other hand, outside the hard core of criminal law. The 
European Commission’s antitrust fining powers . . . are outside the ‘hard core of 
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between investigative and decision-making functions, provided that the EU Courts, 
before which the addressees of Commission fining decisions can appeal, have ‘full 
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law, the challenged decision’. . . .”). 
 260 Joshua, supra note 218. 
 261 Joshua, supra note 26, at 21. 
 262 Joshua, supra note 9, at 7. 
 263 Id. 
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“high degree of corroboration by independent documentary 
evidence.”264 Third, Joshua advocates for a procedure whereby 
oral evidence used to prove violations should be “reduced to 
writing in a formal witness statement, . . . signed by the 
individual, and endorsed and acknowledged by the company on 
whose behalf it is proffered.”265 Fourth, he calls for an almost 
complete ban on anonymity for statements used to prove 
infringement.266 Fifth, he simply states that “[d]eclarants should 
be available at the oral hearing for cross-examination by the 
parties incriminated.”267 Sixth, he advocates for amendments to 
the EU regulations to penalize corporations and individuals for 
giving misleading testimony.268 Lastly, he contends that oral 
leniency applications should serve merely as a “roadmap” for 
DG Competition investigations, and not as evidence of 
infringement.269 
Such a comprehensive overhaul in EC competition 
procedure, however, is unworkable and unlikely.270 First of all, 
as with the ECHR reform approach mentioned above, the EC 
currently lacks an appetite for such sweeping reform.271 Instead, 
a more palatable solution would provide real advancements in 
an incremental manner.272 Second, the holistic reforms that 
Joshua proposes with respect to admitting oral hearsay 
testimony, based on a ‘reliability’ standard, contain the same 
dangers of subjectivity in the Ohio v. Roberts approach that the 
Supreme Court so persuasively rejected in Crawford v. 
Washington.273 In fact, the zealousness with which competition 
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 270 Neelie Kroes, European Comm’r for Competition Policy, Antitrust and 
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authorities have relied upon apparently reliable—but 
ultimately false—oral evidence, as evident in the Stolt-Nielsen 
case, reveals the necessity of a robust right of confrontation 
above and beyond a requirement of contemporaneous 
documentary evidence.274 As a result, Joshua’s suggestions are 
simultaneously too comprehensive in scope and too soft in 
recommendation. A superior solution would embrace 
Crawford’s requirement that testimonial statements may only 
be admitted if the declarant is available for cross-
examination.275 
3. A Right of Confrontation in the Spirit of Crawford 
One of the principal problems to arise from the 2002 
Leniency Notice was the fact that procedures were 
implemented without preparing adequate procedural 
protections.276 While a number of commentators have recently 
advocated for increased procedural protections in EC 
competition hearings,277 to date the proposals have been 
infeasible. A more effective mechanism for securing procedural 
fairness for undertakings in EC competition hearings would 
allow cross-examination of adverse witnesses brought before 
the EC in the spirit of Crawford v. Washington. 
Currently, Regulation 773/2004 states that “[t]he 
Hearing Officer may allow the parties to whom a statement of 
objections has been addressed, the complainants, other persons 
invited to the hearing, the Commission services and the 
authorities of the Member States to ask questions during the 
hearing.”278 An effective solution would add the following to that 
regulation: 
Undertakings subject to a Statement of Objections shall have an 
opportunity to cross-examine any witness upon whose oral 
statements—transcribed or otherwise—the Commission intends to 
rely in proving an infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty. The 
Hearing Officer shall include a statement concerning the credibility 
of each testifying witness in his report. 
  
 274 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 275 Since the oral hearing is the first opportunity for the prosecuted 
undertakings to hear the Commission’s witnesses live, the requirement of previous 
cross-examination of unavailable witnesses set forth in Crawford is inapplicable here. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 
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 277 See discussion supra Parts IV.B.1-2. 
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This solution has a number of benefits. First, it avoids 
the necessity for formal criminalization of cartel conduct, which 
is currently impracticable within the EC.279 Additionally, as 
mentioned above, there is currently no desire among the 
member states of the EU, the General Court, and the ECJ to 
criminalize cartel conduct, and as such, formal criminalization 
is an ineffective means of achieving procedural fairness.280  
Although some may argue that a right of confrontation 
should only apply in criminal cases, and that therefore such a 
right is not necessary in EC hearings, the strong trend in cartel 
enforcement toward quasi-criminal investigations, an 
adversarial hearing model, and increasingly stiff financial 
penalties make the requirement that the hearings be criminal 
merely semantic.281 Moreover, despite the lack of imprisonment 
as a punishment for violation of Article 101,282 and the 
limitation of the American Confrontation Clause to “criminal 
prosecutions,”283 the imposition of crippling fines—affecting the 
lives and livelihoods of employees—even within a quasi-
criminal framework provides a strong, prudential foundation 
for a right of confrontation in EC competition hearings.  
Further, some might contend that the aforementioned 
proposal, which relies on an American case interpreting a 
jurisdiction-specific constitutional provision, represents an 
unjustified, anti-inquisitorial Anglocentrism.284 However, this 
challenge simultaneously ignores the reality of the English and 
American common law influence over the development of cartel 
enforcement in the EC,285 as well as the procedural trends 
toward a common law model that have taken shape within the 
EC itself.286 Therefore, even if the EC fails to fully criminalize 
cartel conduct, it should not be excused from extending key 
procedural rights that bear directly on truth-finding, especially 
when the procedures that already have been adopted so closely 
mirror those of common law systems.287 Lastly, irrespective of 
whether the EC disclaims the “criminal” nature of its cartel 
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enforcement regime,288 the system should, at base, be concerned 
with obtaining reliable, truthful evidence of the sort that only a 
robust right of confrontation can ensure.289 This is especially 
true where the credibility of its evidence-gathering techniques 
is in question. 
Second, allowing cross-examination will provide an 
opportunity for targeted undertakings to directly test the 
credibility of the EC witnesses in the presence of a neutral 
hearing officer. In light of the Stolt-Nielsen decision, it is clear 
that the opportunity to cross-examine such witnesses is vital to 
a fair proceeding in the cartel enforcement context.290 Thus, 
while the proposal here may not affect the opinions of the DG 
Competition case team in its investigation, the Hearing Officer, 
charged with making credibility determinations, will need to 
make a decision as to the live credibility of each witness with 
respect to the statements collected in the leniency and 
investigation process. This will assuredly “improve the quality 
of the contradictory debate.”291 Indeed, it will also provide 
necessary procedural protections that will both improve the 
quality of the evidence garnered in EC competition proceedings 
and the fairness afforded those facing judgment.  
It may be argued that placing the Hearing Officer in the 
role of a decision-maker with respect to credibility raises the 
same reliability concerns that the Supreme Court so forcefully 
criticized in Crawford,292 since the hearing officer will 
ultimately need to make a subjective determination about the 
credibility of the adverse witnesses. However, this challenge 
ignores the fact that the reliability test of Roberts was a 
threshold issue used to determine whether the out-of-court 
statements would be admissible as evidence, not whether the 
trier of fact would ultimately make a subjective judgment.293 
Under the current proposal, the requirement of cross-
examination means that any oral statement may only be used 
as a “roadmap” and not as evidence, unless the individual who 
made the statement is available for cross-examination. 
Moreover, because the Hearing Officer’s report is published in 
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the Official Journal of the European Union,294 credibility 
determinations will shine a light both on the quality of the 
evidence and the efficacy of the procedures. As a result, the 
proposed solution will incentivize the DG Competition case 
teams to produce credible witnesses and ensure testimonial 
accuracy.  
Finally, the solution proposed here is incremental and 
legislative, avoiding the problems that attend comprehensive 
overhauls and judicially-mandated reforms.295 Creating a right 
of confrontation and cross-examination in the Crawford mold 
first solves the immediate problem of admitting untested and 
unsworn oral statements gathered in the investigatory stage,296 
while, at the same time, recognizing that oral statements are 
vital in uncovering conspiracies and incentivizing undertakings 
to apply for leniency.297 Additionally, this proposal gives the 
accused an opportunity to challenge the credibility of witnesses 
before a neutral hearing officer, creating a disincentive for 
individuals and applicants for leniency to lie. Further, the 
proposal advocated here requires only a minor amendment to 
an existing regulation, incurring comparatively less 
institutional and monetary costs than competing “holistic” 
solutions, and representing a single-but-necessary step in an 
incremental approach toward a robust set of procedural rights. 
Although some may contend that the current proposal fails to 
go far enough, the strength of the proposal lies in the fact that 
it will allow the Commission and targeted undertakings to ease 
into durable procedural protections. In this way, the current 
proposal avoids the dangers of the initial effort to allow oral 
corporate statements brought about in the 2002 amendments 
to the Leniency Programme—which while an important 
advancement, lacked necessary foresight and procedural 
protections, providing too much room for abuse by the DG 
Competition and leniency applicants.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The introduction of procedures for accepting oral 
statements in the leniency and investigatory contexts 
represented an important addition to EC competition 
procedure. However, the consequences of relying on oral 
statements as evidence against co-conspirators include both a 
shift toward the adversarial system of justice and a marked 
increase in the need for procedural protections to prevent abuse 
and to ensure testimonial accuracy. Centuries of common law 
have demonstrated that the best way to protect against 
overzealousness in law enforcement and dishonesty in 
testimonial statements by co-conspirators is through cross-
examination. Therefore, in order to ensure procedural fairness 
in the EC, there must be a right for accused undertakings to 
confront and cross-examine those witnesses on whose oral 
statements the EC intends to rely as evidence. 
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